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Abstract:
Low intensity armed conflict is usually related to population displacement, altering networks and social
capital in a↵ected regions. With an incentivized questionnaire performed in the Colombian co↵ee growing axis
(Eje Cafetero), we observe contribution to an abstract and anonymous public good when contributions are
not enforceable. Game contributions are significantly higher in regions with high net-changes of population
due to displacement, both for regions with net in-flow and net out-flow, compared to a more stable area.
We find that the e↵ect is especially strong for women in net out-flow areas; usually the most a↵ected if
male family members are forcibly displaced. We further propose a local inspection mechanism, and show
that it increases contributions in all areas independently of the displacement history of the location and the
individuals preferences with respect to this mechanism.
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1 Introduction
”Social Capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective action. It encompasses
institutions, relationships, and customs that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social
interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social capital is critical for societies to prosper
economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital, when enhanced in a positive
manner, can improve project e↵ectiveness and sustainability by building the community’s capacity
to work together to address their common needs, fostering greater inclusion and cohesion, and
increasing transparency and accountability.”
The World Bank1
The concept of social capital has received increasing attention from sociologists (e.g. Coleman, 1988),
political scientists (e.g. Putnam, 2000) and economists (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2002) over the last decades. For
the case of developing countries exposed to conflict, social capital is of especially high importance (Corbacho
et al., 2014). Specifically while physical capital can easily be recuperated once a phase of conflict ends,
damages to social capital might be much more persistent through time. Many opinions exist concerning
what should be included in the definition of social capital, but it is generally agreed that it is related to the
existence of ‘social networks’ and the inclination, based on these networks, to do things for each other. Hence,
disruptions in social networks might crucially alter social capital. Identifying the nature of these alterations
is crucial to design e↵ective post-conflict policies and programs.
Colombia has been in a long-lasting low-intensity armed conflict for more than fifty years. This conflict
has had an important impact on the population, especially in rural areas. The number of attacks and
massacres perpetuated by the di↵erent fronts lead to the killing of 220,000 Colombians, 80 percent of which
were civilians. As a consequence, the internal displacement flows of the population have been very important.
Colombia is the country with the highest number of Internally Displaced Persons in the world, with a total
of between 4.9 and 5.5 million.2 The in-flows and out-flows of displaced individuals have dramatically altered
the structure and composition of social networks, and hence the dynamics of social capital.
With an incentivized questionnaire performed in the Colombian ’Eje Cafetero’, we observe contributions
to an abstract and anonymous public good when contributions are not enforceable. The aim of this paper
is to study how the displacement history in di↵erent locations is linked to such behaviors. We find that
areas that have su↵ered greater network disruptions, either due to high in- or out-flows of population due to
displacement, show on average significantly greater contributions than a stable area. Meanwhile all studied
locations faced similar levels of conflict incidence. We specifically focus on women, that might have an
especially strong need to be included in local networks and community based organizations when they head
a household (Barr et al., 2015), and indeed observe for them greater contributions. We further propose a
1http://go.worldbank.org/C0QTRW4QF0
2Source: ’Enough Already!’ by the Centro de la Memoria Historica (2013) retrieved at:
www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/en/reports
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mechanism to improve our abstract measure of social capital, specifically with the availability of a sanctioning
mechanism for misbehavior. We find that this mechanism is e↵ective in all areas, and its e↵ectiveness
is independent of the individuals preferences towards with respect to this mechanism. In a country like
Colombia, studying the determinants of social capital, and what can be done to improve it, can have important
policy implications for the design of development programs.
The relationship between incidence of conflict and social capital, using di↵erent measurements ranging
from experimental approaches to opinion surveys and questionnaires on political and social involvement,
has garnered increasing academic interest. Among others, Bellows and Miguel (2006) study how individuals
directly a↵ected by the war in Sierra Leone are more likely to participate in social and political movements,
and Voors et al. (2012) study how altruism towards a close community increases for individuals exposed
to violence in Burundi. Studies in Colombia show how the social networks’ composition and the reliance
on social networks is linked to armed conflict and forced internal displacement (Kaplan and Nussio, 2012;
Attanasio et al., 2008). Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, we focus on displacement
flows, di↵erentiating between three types of regions: those with high net out-flows and those with high net
in-flows of displaced persons, and compare them to a control region with low changes in population level.
In all studied regions the conflict incidence indicators have been at a similarly high level. However due to
their di↵erent geographical locations, certain of these regions are neighbouring relatively more or relatively
less violent regions, respectively. We find that in regions where displacement has been strong (both net in-
and net out-flows), participants report to contribute significantly more to an abstract public good played
with partners from the same municipality. Second, we study the e↵ectiveness of a inspection mechanism
in improving social capital as measured by such public good contributions. In a setting where trust in
institutions needs to be rebuild, preferences across di↵erent types of institutions might influence reactions
to them. We compare the behavior of participants in the standard public good game with a public good
game that introduces a inspection authority from the municipality. The introduction of a inspector leads to
a significant increase in contributions to the public good and the e↵ect of the inspector does not di↵er across
regions. Finally, we elicited participants preferences between two inspectors: local (from the municipality) or
external (from the nation’s capital Bogota).3 We observe that farmers in net out-flow areas are most likely
to choose local inspectors. However, we do not find that preferences over inspectors significantly a↵ect the
reaction to local inspectors when local inspection was imposed.
A further unique characteristic of our dataset is that we have observations linked to participants personal
exposure to displacement. We can thus characterize participants based on their personal history of displace-
ment and their current location. We distinguish between individuals that have been displaced themselves and
3See Gneezy and Fessler (2012) for an alternative approach to punishment on pro-social activities using dictator games.
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individuals experiencing a rupture of their network due to the displacement of family members. We observe
that individuals left behind who live in areas with a considerable in-flow of displaced persons contribute sig-
nificantly more in the abstract public good situation. The opposite is true for displaced individuals arriving
to areas with an substantial out-flow of displaced persons. While these results do not allow us to draw any
causal conclusions due to the possible self-selection into displacement, they enable us to characterize a crucial
minority strongly a↵ected by internal displacement.
The topic of this paper is closely related to the literature on the negative correlation of armed conflict
and economic activity. Cassar et al. (2013) study persistent e↵ects of conflict on a sample of individuals
years after the Tajik civil war. They find that violence reinforces kinship-based norms of morality while
decreasing trust within a↵ected villages. Dube and Vargas (2013) showed how co↵ee price fluctuations have
a↵ected the capacity of armed groups to recruit fighters from co↵ee-producing areas. The conflict has had
additional non-negligible consequences for the local infrastructure: for example, in the district of Caldas,
several cooperatives have had their collection points vandalized or destroyed at one time or another, leading
to important economic losses. Forced displacement and its consequences concerning incentives for long-term
investments, property rights and participation in local institutions are important research questions. While a
number of studies have investigated the e↵ect of Colombia’s armed conflict on economic activity (for example
Rettberg, Leiteritz and Nasi, 2010), to the best of our knowledge very little research has been done on the
e↵ect of the armed conflict on small co↵ee farmers’ social capital. Mun˜oz-Mora (2010) studies the e↵ect of
the armed conflict on co↵ee production. Riascos and Vargas (2011) study the relationship between violence
and growth. Arias and Iban˜ez (2012) and Iban˜ez, Mun˜oz-Mora and Verwinp (2013) look at the e↵ect of
the presence of armed groups and illicit crops on small farmers’ crop and investment choices, showing that
instability biases farmers’ choices towards shorter term crops and investments. We aim to contribute to the
understanding of the relationship between economic institutions and social capital in a conflict setting by
analyzing social capital in a rural co↵ee-growing district.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we discuss the di↵erent approaches to measuring
social capital. In section 3, we present the field setting, specifically the Caldas department in Colombia.
Section 4 presents the incentivised questionnaire, describes the sample and presents the hypotheses to be
tested. In section 5, we present the results for the abstract public good situation and discuss how socio-
economic factors and the history of conflict are related to behavior. Section 6 discusses the e↵ectiveness of
the introduction of a local inspector on contributions. Section 7 presents some extensions on behavior by
participants directly a↵ected by displacement. Section 8 concludes.
4
2 Measuring social capital
Since there are multiple di↵erent definitions of social capital, measuring social capital is not an easy task.
According to the guideline of the World Bank,4 social capital can be linked to five key dimensions that can
be separately measured: groups and networks, trust, collective action, social inclusion and information and
communication. Frequently these dimensions are evaluated through questionnaires. For example, questions
about trust are framed as: ”Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”; about collective action as: ”Do you help out a local group as
a volunteer?”; and about networks as: ”If you suddenly needed a small amount of money, how many people
beyond your immediate household could you turn to?”. However, data collected through self-reports can
easily be biased if participants believe that certain answers are expected from them or if they do not want
to reveal their true beliefs. Furthermore, answers on subjective grading scales might be di cult to compare
across participants.
Self-reports can sometimes be validated by crossing them with reports from local organizations concerning
volunteers or by observing actual borrowing and lending between group members. However, data concerning
such actions is not always easily obtainable and is subject to significant noise. An interesting alternative is
therefore to elicit behavior in controlled experimental conditions. If such behavior is reliably correlated with
di↵erent dimensions of social capital, it can provide more reliable information than self-reports and more
precise information than actual economic actions.
One dimension of social capital, namely collective action, can be linked to behavior in public good games.5
A large volume of literature exists on laboratory public good games (for reviews, see Ledyard, 1995, and
Chaudhuri, 2011). Recent studies have further investigated the external validity of behavior in such games.
Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) present a laboratory experiment with fishermen in Brazil that links the individ-
ual’s behavior in a laboratory public good game with characteristics of the individual’s nets used for fishing.
Larger holes allow small animals to escape and thus the size of holes in nets provides information about
the extraction level of these fishermen concerning the common pool resource they share. Indeed, the paper
shows that behavior outside the laboratory can be linked to behavior in the laboratory game. In a similar
vein, Rustagi, Engel and Kosfeld (2010) link Ethiopian forest managing groups’ outcomes to the members’
behavior in a laboratory public good game. Their results show that the proportion of conditional coopera-
tors as identified through the laboratory experiment, can predict outcomes of the forest management group.
4Source: www.go.worldbank.org/TC9QT67HG0
5An experimental paradigm often used to measure another dimension of social capital is the trust game (e.g. Berg et al.,
1995). Behavior in this game can be linked to behavior in real-life decision situations, for example, the likelihood to default on
loans (Karlan, 2005) or reciprocity in vote buying (Finan and Schechter, 2012). However, behavior in the trust game can also
be linked to risk preferences (Eckel and Wilson, 2004) and has been more generally linked to betrayal aversion (Bohnet and
Zeckhauser, 2004).
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Figure 1: Department of Caldas and selected study locations. Blue shading indicates average homicide levels
over last 10 years in the departments municipalities.
Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa (2012), in an study involving farmers from Costa Rica, linked laboratory
free riding to free riding on cooperative rules by selling good-quality co↵ee outside the cooperative at higher
prices.
3 Field setting: socio-economic and institutional situation of the
Caldas district
The study was performed in di↵erent municipalities in the district of Caldas in the summer of 2012. The
district of Caldas is at the center of the Colombian ‘Eje Cafetero’, a traditional co↵ee growing area. The
Caldas department has 38.758 co↵ee farmers, with 87.127 ha of planted co↵ee. Co↵ee represents 59% of the
Caldas agricultural gross domestic product (GDP).6
Violence has been high in all regions with some local variations in aggressors. The western part of the
Caldas department had seen a significant presence of FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)7
forces with progression of the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)8, which left indigenous communities
as special victims of the conflict. The eastern region was mainly AUC dominated with the progression of
guerrillas. Table I and Figure 1 present measures of the intensity of conflict in the di↵erent municipalities.9
6Source: statistical reports by the Comite Departamental de Caldas (year 2013).
7Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
8United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia.
9See Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2004) for a description of the di↵erent data sources on the Colombian conflict.
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Figure 2: Department of Caldas and selected study locations. Blue shading indicates net population changes
(IPD - IID) in the departments municipalities. Positive numbers (dark blue shades) represent net in-flow
areas. Negative numbers (light blue shades) represent net out-flow areas.
We can see that violence has a↵ected all municipalities. Average homicide rates over the last 10 years vary
from 36 to 4842 (per 100.000 inhabitants) across the 27 municipalities of the department. Note that average
homicide rates for whole Colombia have been over the same period at 39 (per 100.000 inhabitants).
As presented by Dube and Vargas (2013), the break of the Pacto Cafetero in 1989 and the consequent
decrease in co↵ee prices increased the recruitment by armed groups and the presence of illicit crops in the
region.10 The situation, as described in Palacio and Cifuentes (2005), increased the displacement indexes
starting in the beginning of the 1990s. As can be seen in Table II, the northern and more eastern parts of
the department have su↵ered net out-flows of population, the western parts of the department have been net
recipients, and the central area, the capital Manizales and the nearby towns, have had very small changes
concerning the net balance of the population size.
According to the United Nations O ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian A↵airs (OCHA Colombia),
the production of illicit crops in the department of Caldas is limited to the most eastern part of the district,
and no production is reported in any of the municipalities in our sample. However, the fact that the mu-
nicipalities of Manzanares and Marquetalia, that are close to the production zone identified by OCHA, have
a high net in-flow of displaced population, may be due to population flows coming from towns where illicit
crops are present.
The municipalities selected for the study sessions are in the northern part of the department (Aguadas), the
central-northern part (Neira), central-south (Villamaria) and the eastern part (Manzanares and Marquetalia).
10See ‘Los Derechos Humanos en el Departamento de Caldas’ (2003) for detailed information on the impact of the armed
conflict on infrastructure and di↵erent vulnerable groups in the department.
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All selected municipalities show average homicide rates over the last 10 years in a range from 249 to 460, and
are thus in an intermediate range relative to other municipalities of the department. Concerning population
flows we observe some variance across the selected municipalities. As can be seen in Table II and Figure 2,
Aguadas shows a high levels of net out-flow of population, Villamaria and Neira have very small net changes
and Manzanares and Marquetalia are net recipients of population flows. Note that both Net In-Flow and
Net Out-Flow areas have experienced a non-negligible outflow of inhabitants due to the conflict (Aguadas:
IID2009=5.7; Manzanares: IID2009=4.6 and Marquetalia: IID2009=13.1), placing them in the top 40%
concerning this variable in the department. The net in-flow areas, have however experienced an in-flow of
population about double their population out-flow. The net out-flow area in contrast shows in-flows only
about half the size as observed out-flows.
We were not able to obtain detailed historic data on the di↵erent migration waves, but interviews at the
visited locations stressed that the displaced were mainly male farmers moving to a nearby co↵ee growing
location to avoid conflict and the pressure to switch to farming illicit crops. The problem of left behind family
members was highlighted during the same set of interviews. The families left behind, are mostly headed by
women, which continue co↵ee farming on the families plots. Due to lower experience and skill level of women
in co↵ee farming, the left behind women were actively searching for help and advice from neighbours and
the cooperative. Consequently, it was pointed out that sub-locations that had faced an substantial out-flow
of the population, were the most involved in the co↵ee cooperative and other community associations.
In all of the visited municipalities co↵ee production is based on small-scale farmers (owning less than
0.5 hectare of land). We aimed at selecting municipalities with similar structures concerning land property
(small farmers) and the institutional setting of the co↵ee market (members of the two biggest cooperatives
in the region).11 Other locations in the Department (e.g. Manizales), are characterized by larger farms, and
were thus not included in the study. Farmers of the western part of the district (i.e. west of the Cauca River),
predominantly belong to a smaller indigenous co↵ee producers association and were also not included in the
sample due to special social norms prevailing in indigenous populations.
In all of the municipalities, the role of the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC) has been
relevant with regards to the provision of public goods beyond investment related to co↵ee farming. This role
has been especially important in the provision of social public goods. For example, it is almost impossible to
find a school in any of the veredas (municipality sub-locations) that did not receive significant support from
the Fondo Nacional del Cafe´ to finance building and furniture.
11Participants in Neira, Villamaria, Manzanares and Marquelalia are members of the Cooperativa de Manizales. This coop-
erative (the biggest in the region) spans to municipalities on both sides of the cordillera. Farmers in Aguadas are members of
the Cooperativa de Caficultores de Aguadas.
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4 The choice situations and questionnaire
4.1 The incentivized questionnaire on public good behavior
Participants were presented with an incentivized questionnaire to elicit behavior in a public good type choice
situation. The questionnaire format was used due to logistic constraints, not allowing for a proper experimen-
tal setup. Recent research has indeed confirmed that answers to hypothetical experimental scenarios are the
best predictors of actual game behavior (Falk et al., 2015). Since answers to our incentivized questionnaire
were not purely hypothetical but earnings were based on own choices, we expect answers to be even further
correlated with true game behavior.
The study had two parts, as shown in Figure 3. In the first part, no inspection mechanism was available,
which was later introduced at the beginning of the second part. The first part consisted of a choice task
concerning investment in an abstract public good. Participants made their individual decisions and were
informed that their earnings from total public good production would be determined by their own choices
and the choices of three other players who participated in the game.12
The abstract public good situation was presented with the usual instructions in public good experiments.
Each participant received an initial endowment of 10 monetary units and had to decide how many of these
to transfer to a group envelope (xi 2 {0,10}). Each unit transferred to the group envelope was multiplied
by 1.5 by the experimenters and the individual received one-fourth of the total in this group envelope. The
individual would therefore receive a payo↵ of: ⇡i = (10  xi) + 1.5/4 ⇤ (
P
xj).
The situation was presented in neutral and abstract terms. Each farmer received two envelopes: one
labeled ‘personal envelope’ with ten monetary units (wooden ice-cream sticks) and one empty envelope
labeled ‘group envelope’. Each participant had to decide how many monetary units to transfer from one
envelope to the other. No feedback about decisions and earnings was given until the end of the session.
After the initial game, we introduced a inspection mechanism. The inspection mechanism was framed as
costly to stress its significance. The cost consisted of a one-point deduction from final earnings to ‘pay the
inspector’. This fixed cost could not be avoided and did not alter the budget available for contributions to the
public good. The inspection mechanism was not further specified but participants knew that it would lead
to fines for participants with the lowest contribution towards their group and that the mechanism needed to
be ‘activated’ by an inspector. The inspector had neither benefits nor costs associated with the activation.
It was made especially clear that the collected fines would go back to the organizers of the experiment and
not to the inspector. The inspection was thus not automatic but depended on the inspectors’ willingness to
activate the mechanism. It was also made clear that no one would ‘control’ what the inspector did. Expected
12Choices were based on randomly selected strategies from the same municipality.
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1.'Public'good'situa@on'(no'inspector)'–'with%partners%from%own%municipality%
2.'Public'good'situa@on'(with'local'inspector)'–'with%partners%from%own%municipality%
3.'Stated'preference'between'a'hypothe@cal'central'or'local'inspector'
Note:%No%feedback%concerning%outcomes%was%given%between%the%different%parts.%
Figure 3: Order of events in experimental session.
individual payo↵s given this inspection mechanism would therefore depend on the subjects’ beliefs when an
inspection would be performed. Specifically, the expected payo↵ of the lowest contributor of the group would
be: ⇡i  c ⇤P (inspection performed), where c indicates the fine to be payed, and P () the probability that an
inspection is performed. If the individual beliefs that the probability of inspection is equal to zero, payo↵s
would be the same as in the case without inspections. Behavior would therefore remain unchanged regardless
of the presence of an inspector. If, however, a participant is certain that the inspection will be performed,
the mechanism would yield a situation equivalent to perfect monitoring. In this case own payo↵-maximizing
individuals would have to use some sort of level-k reasoning to determine their actions. I.e. dependent on
how much they believe other participants will contribute to the public good, they will aim at contributing
an ✏ > 0 larger amount compared to the lowest contribution (e.g. Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995).
Participants were informed that the person selected to activate the inspection was someone from their own
municipality (local inspector). Contribution decisions in this game thus enable us to measure the e↵ectiveness
of a local inspection institution on enforcing contributions in a public good type situation. Behavior of local
inspectors was based on choices by randomly selected local participants who answered the question: If you
were the inspector, would you inspect? 13
Since real-life inspection mechanisms are often not local, we further elicited relative preferences between
the above presented inspection mechanism and a central inspection mechanism. While in the local inspection
scenario the inspector came from the same municipality, under the hypothetical central inspection case the
inspector was presented as a representative of the FNC from Bogota. Participants were asked which type of
inspection they preferred (local or central) after all public good games were played and before any feedback
was given about the outcomes of these games.
4.2 Methods and summary statistics
The experimental sessions were performed in di↵erent municipalities in the district of Caldas in the summer
of 2012. The selected municipalities are divided into an urban part and several sub-locations called veredas.
13An individuals answer to this question was never used concerning the same individuals contribution decision.
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The commercial services of the municipality are at the urban area, while farmers live at the sub-locations.
At each sub-locations live on average 40 farming families, which share some communal services as water and
the management of the local school. Sub-locations are on average around one hour away from the urban
center of the municipality, and the habitants usually can only reach the urban center by the daily bus service.
While it is not possible due to the sensitivity of the information to obtain detailed data on the in- and out-
flows of displacement on each of these sub-locations, it is reported that generally displacement has mainly
a↵ected farmers in these remote areas. Also they have been the usual receivers for in-flow given that displaced
individuals are mainly farmers.
The study was performed with the logistic support of CRECE, the research center of the National Co↵ee
Federation in Manizales, the district capital, and the Cooperatives of Aguadas and Manizales. In each of
the municipalities several sub-locations were randomly selected and the sessions where performed in the
primary schools of the sub-locations.14 Invitations to the sessions where send by the extension o cers of
the cooperative, inviting one participant per household. Turnout based on invitations averaged 95% in the
chosen locations. Given the extremely high response rate and the size of the sub-locations, concerns on sample
selection at the local level are minimal. Given the distance between sub-locations and the low mobility of
farmers, the possibility of sample contamination between the di↵erent sessions was minimal. Sessions were
run in the afternoons to be able to use the local school premises, and lasted approximately for 1h30 for the
experiments and post- experimental questionnaires. Average earnings from study participation represented
approximately a half-day’s labor salary of an agricultural worker. We conducted nine distinct experimental
sessions in eight locations. The study had two distinct parts: a series of public good type decision situations,
analyzed in this paper, and a sequence of trust game situations presented in Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa
(2014).
Participants made individual decisions with respect to three hypothetical players whose strategies were
based on choices made by others. This gives us 260 independent observations concerning contributions to the
public good. Overall, each participant made decisions with respect to two di↵erent incentivized public good
choice tasks (see Figure 3). In an in-subjects design we can therefore compare behavior with and without the
existence of the inspection mechanism. No feedback was given between the tasks. Each situation was orally
explained and questions were asked to participants to ensure their understanding. Due to low literacy rates,
no written instructions were handed out and all participants were assured that there was no right or wrong
decision in the game. After the experimental part, participants responded to a personal questionnaire with
respect to various personal, economic and household variables.
14An exception had to be made in the municipality of Manzanares due to safety concerns, and the farmers of the sub-location
were invited to go to the municipal center for the study which was scheduled just after a meeting of the local farmers assembly.
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A total of 260 farmers participated in the study; 39% of them were women, with an average age of 51 years
(std. dev. 13.4). In Table III(a) we present summary statistics for our total sample of participants. Average
earnings from the experiment were equivalent to about 10.000 COL pesos (about $5.25 US). Table III(b)
presents summary statistics for some key variables at the municipal level. We see some di↵erences across the
included municipalities, especially concerning the share of the population not born in the municipality and
the impact of displacement. We will explore this variation to explain contributions in the public good task.
4.3 Hypotheses
We aim at investigating three questions with our experimental data. Specifically: (1) whether contributions to
the public good (i.e. social capital) are altered in areas with high net in- or out-flows of displaced individuals;
(2) whether the gender imbalance related to displacement is influencing contributions to the public good and
(3) whether an imposed inspection institution can improve contributions.
Concerning the first point, we hypothesize that in addition to exposure to violence as such, the additional
strain on the population due to the internal displacement will influence the willingness to contribute to public
goods in the local community. Along with earlier results that have observed that exposure to conflict increases
an individuals altruism and investment towards the local community (Voors et al, 2012; Bellows and Miguel,
2006), our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Both net in-flows and net out-flows of population in an area will increase the
willingness to contribute to public goods.
In relation to the second point we expect that the e↵ect will depend on the individuals position in
each area. Net in-flow areas face the problem of absorbing newcomers, that have to be integrated, in the
community. As for the case of other types of stress events in an area, this will influence the whole population.
Net out-flow areas predominantly face the problem of a loss of its members moving to other areas. The loss
of a displaced person will particularly pose a problem for individuals dependent or relying on the displaced
person. We therefore expect that the e↵ect will be mainly visible for those that face a higher risk of being
left behind. Since a large proportion of displaced are men (in our sample 89%; see Table A:1) we hypothesize
that women will be more a↵ected by the displacement flows in areas showing a high net out-flow. Specifically:
Hypothesis 2: Women will show a stronger e↵ect concerning public good contributions than men
in net out-flow areas. We expect no gender di↵erences in net in-flow areas.
In relation to the last of the three points, we will further investigate the preferences for a inspection
mechanism and its e↵ectiveness. Building new institutions will be important in all areas exposed to high
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displacement flows. However we hypothesize that preferences for the type of inspector will depend on com-
munity specific problems. We expect that areas with a high net in-flow of displaced will be relatively more
likely to fear influence by the newcomers on local decisions. Meanwhile, areas with high net out-flow of
individuals will have an increased concern for the local network. Specifically:
Hypothesis 3: When facing the choice between a local inspector or a nation wide (thus external)
inspection, participants from net in-flow areas will prefer a non-local mechanism, while partici-
pants from net out-flow areas will choose a local mechanism.
Finally the e↵ectiveness of an imposed inspection mechanism might depend on these preferences. An
imposed inspection mechanism might thus be more e cient for those who also have a preference for and
belief in the mechanism. We hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Individual preferences for the local inspection mechanism will increase contributions
when this mechanism is in place.
We will now turn to the analysis of the experimental results. First, when no inspection mechanism was
available and second when the inspection mechanism was imposed.
5 Public good contributions: no inspections
5.1 Abstract contribution to public good
We start by analyzing the determinants of behavior in the public good situation with no inspections. Overall
contributions to the public good game were 5.76 points out of 10 (std. dev. 2.63). From Figure 4 we see
that, on average, participants contributed 6.02 and 6.06 points in the areas that were net-receivers and net-
exporters of displaced populations, respectively. This is significantly more than contributions in the central
stable region (Wilcoxon test15; p=0.029 and p=0.0003, respectively). This result is in line with hypothesis
1. Contributions by net in-flow and out-flow areas are not significantly di↵erent (p=0.781).
We further observe that di↵erent parts of the population react di↵erently to disruptions of the social
network (see regressions in Table IV). Women in net out-flow areas make significantly larger contributions
than men in their area and than women in other areas (Table IV: (3) and (4)). This result is in line with
hypothesis 2. High intensity of displacement in a region especially threatens women, who are more likely to
be left behind. In response, women will build new links with other community members. Our results confirm
this e↵ect for an anonymous interaction.
15All tests, unless otherwise specified, are Wilcoxon rank-sum tests; p values are two-sided.
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Figure 4: Contribution to Public Good (no inspections)
5.2 Controlling for conflict indicators
Displacement is obviously linked to violence and conflict. To get a better understanding of the results
presented above, we thus have to take into account the relationship between net in-flow and out-flow areas and
their level of violence. As discussed in section 3 (see also Table II), homicide rates and other conflict indicators
are not very di↵erent for the areas with net in-flow and net out-flow. This is because the areas receiving a net
in-flow in our sample are far from what could be considered safe areas. Both net in-flow municipalities are
located at the eastern side of the cordillera, south of coca producing areas that are portrayed by even higher
levels of violence and are exposed to an even higher degree of conflict (OCHA Colombia). While one of them
presents higher homicide rates (Manzanares), the other is at the low end of that indicator (Marquetalia). In
comparison the net out-flow areas are worse than their neighboring municipalities, but not worse than the
high conflict area in the net in-flow area. While overall public good contributions are not di↵erent when
we compare net in-flow and net out-flow areas, we might anticipate some significant di↵erences across areas
exposed to more or less violence.
Since our main concern is with conflict that has been ongoing over the last years, we use the average
homicide rate over the last 10 years (see Table II) to identify areas that had a relatively high or low exposure
to violence for the municipalities with high displacement flows. Indeed we observe slightly higher contributions
to the experimental public good in a high conflict, net in-flow area (Manzanares) compared to a low conflict,
net in-flow municipality (Marquetalia): 6.07 versus 5.92. However this di↵erence is not significant (p=0.79).
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6 Increasing social capital: a local inspection mechanism
A large literature in experimental economics has investigated the e↵ects of central taxation of free riders (e.g.
Falkinger et al., 2000) and decentralized punishment (e.g. Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). Both mechanisms are
generally e↵ective in increasing contributions to the public good. Note that our inspection mechanism di↵ers
from these. Unlike central taxation, we introduce uncertainty in the e↵ectiveness of the inspection mechanism.
Participants are not certain that free riders will actually be punished, with the outcome depending on the
actions of another participant and not on an independent random mechanism. Di↵erences in reactions to a
local inspector compared to the first public good decision will thus provide information regarding the belief
in the e↵ectiveness of this institution. Unlike decentralized punishment institutions, our inspection does not
represent a higher level of public good, since inspecting has no obvious costs for the inspector.
Participants repeat the first game played, with the di↵erence that a local inspector is introduced. Figure
5 shows how behavior changes versus the first game. On average, contributions increase by 0.790 points
(p=0.0009). Note that since the game with the coordinator was always played second, possible order e↵ects
would rather underestimate the e↵ect of the coordination device since repetition typically reduces contribu-
tions in public good situations (e.g. Fehr and Gaechter, 2000).
Since all participants played both games, we can study how the e↵ect of the treatment (introduction of
a inspector) varies across di↵erent regions and across individual characteristics. Moreover, we can see how
individual and location characteristics interact with regard to contribution in both treatments. Hence, we
proceed by estimating
yirt =   ⇤ Treatment+ ↵1 ⇤ Treatment ⇤Xi + ↵2 ⇤ Treatment ⇤Xr+ (1)
 1Xi ⇤Xr +  2Xi +  3Xr + "irt
Where yirt is the contribution of individual i in region r under each of the treatments t (No inspector
and inspector), Xi represents individual characteristics, and Xr represents regional characteristics.
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table V we see that the treatment does significantly increase contributions
by approximately 0.8 points on average (see also Figure 5). We further examine the e↵ects of the area’s
displacement history. As we observed in the previous section for the game without inspector, we see that
areas with net in-flow and net out-flow of displacement show greater public good contributions (Table V
columns (3), (4)); however, the e↵ect of the inspection mechanism does not di↵er significantly across areas
(Table V columns (5), (6)).
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Figure 5: Comparing contributions to public good with and without inspection mechanism.
It needs to be stressed again that our aim has been to compare areas with high net in- or out-flow of
individuals. However these net changes are not necessarily correlated with the absolute in-flow or out-flow in a
region. For example remember that the municipality with the highest net in-flow in our sample (Marquetalia),
is also characterized by the highest absolute out-flow (see Table I). We thus separately analyze the impact of
in-flow and out-flow by using raw indexes for in-flow (IIPD: Index of Pressure of Displacement) and out-flow
(IID: Index of Intensity of Displacement) instead of the categorization based on net changes. We see that the
absolute in-flow decreases contributions while the out-flow leads to increased contributions. The interaction
of these indicators with treatment is insignificant (Table A:2).
While we observe no regional di↵erences concerning reaction to the imposed local inspector, we hypothesize
local di↵erences in preference for this type of inspection. As discussed earlier, we proposed two (hypothetical)
inspectors to participants: a farmer from the municipality or an external inspector from the National Co↵ee
Federation headquarters in Bogota. Participants generally had real-life experiences related to both types of
inspectors: for example, through involvement in community associations managed by a local leader and the
local and regional committees of the National Co↵ee Federation (note that all participating farmers in our
study are members of the FNC).
Figure 6 presents results concerning preference for inspection. We find that regions with a net out-flow
of population show the strongest preferences for municipal inspectors (i.e. 62.31%). Preferences are lower in
the net stable area (48.94%) and significantly lower in the regions characterized by a net in-flow (45.57%,
p=0.018). This is in line with hypothesis 3.
We finally investigate the relationship between preferences and reactions to the local inspection mecha-
nism. Stated preferences for the local inspection are higher in regions with net out-flows, but reactions to this
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Figure 6: Preference for local inspector
inspector are the same as in high in-flow areas. Indeed, we observe that preferences for the local inspector
do not influence the e↵ectiveness of the introduction of the local inspector (Table VII, columns (2) to (4)).
Thus, when a local inspector is imposed, reactions are independent of farmers’ preferences concerning the
type of inspection. This results is thus contradicting our hypothesis 4. However the strength of preferences
might play a role here. Unfortunately the strength of preferences was not elicited during the study.
7 Extension: the impact of personal displacement history
While the analysis of the previous section mainly focused on area di↵erences concerning displacement, we
might further wonder whether individual e↵ects concerning displacement history can be observed. While the
comparison across areas allowed us to identify regions that were relatively similar concerning exposure to
conflict and economic variables, individuals with a personal exposure to displacement can obviously not be
considered as random representatives of the population. Displaced individuals might be di↵erent in many
respects, for example by having characteristics that made them more vulnerable to being attacked in the
first place. In addition those actually leaving might be characterized by factors making them more mobile
or more willing to take the risk of displacement. Our sample enables us to investigate the characteristics of
those displaced or otherwise exposed to displacement and how they behave in an anonymous public good
dilemma.
A number of participants were themselves displaced, others had members of their family displaced and are
thus left behind. We present in Table A:1 the characteristics of participants directly a↵ected by displacement,
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either as being personally displaced (N=9) or being left-behind after the displacement of a first-degree family
member (N=25). Given the overall percentage of women in our sample (39.6%), women are overrepresented
among left behind individuals (48%). The opposite is true for displaced individuals, that are by majority
male (8 out of 9, i.e. 89%). Both groups consider violence to be an important problem at their location:
it is highlighted as an important problem by 17.4% and 11.1% of the left behind and displaced individuals
respectively (versus 5.9% in the overall sample).
An important question in this setting, together with the di↵erential contributions across regions, is whether
the personal displacement history has any e↵ect on public good contributions and on the e↵ectiveness of
the proposed mechanism to increase these contributions. Being left behind or displaces has a such no
significant impact on public good contributions (Table A:3 (1)). However we find that participants with
displaced family members contribute significantly more when they are in net in-flow areas (see Table A:3 for
interactions between personal history and location history). In contrast incoming displaced persons arriving
in net out-flow areas contribute significantly less.16 Thus specifically in the regions with high net in-flow,
those left behind from displacement are generally higher contributors to the public good (7.4 points versus
5.82, p=0.04). This sub-group is in a complex situation, left behind by their own family but in a community
with a significant in-flow of newcomers. Their increase in pro-social behavior might be caused either by their
own vulnerability or by increased empathy for the newcomers.
8 Conclusions
With an incentivized questionnaire performed in the Colombian ’Eje Cafetero’, we observe contribution to an
abstract and anonymous public good when contributions are not enforceable. We study how the displacement
history in di↵erent locations is linked to such behaviors: we find that areas with net in-flow and net out-
flows of population due to displacement have significantly higher contributions than an area with stable
population. We further propose a mechanism to improve our abstract measure of social capital, specifically
with the availability of a sanctioning mechanism for misbehavior. We find that this mechanism is very
e↵ective, increasing contributions by around 8 % of the endowment. We also find that the e↵ectiveness of
this mechanism does not vary across regions or across individuals with di↵erent preferences with respect to
this mechanism. At the individual level, we specifically focus on women, that might have an especially strong
need to be included in local networks and community based organizations when they head a household (Barr
et al., 2015).
Our contribution is twofold. First, the setting allow us to compare three areas with very similar levels of
16See Iban˜ez and Moya (2010) and Moya (2013), among others, for studies on the behavior of displaced individuals in Colombia.
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incidence of conflict, but very di↵erent population displacement flows. This allows us to study the e↵ect of
network disruptments, due to displacement, independent from the well known e↵ects of conflict on behavior.
Second, the fact of having information on the individual and location history with respect to displacement,
allows us to investigate their interaction. We find that displaced individuals in areas of net out-flow, and
left-behing families in areas of net in-flow show relatively smaller contributions and have a greater preference
for a national inspection mechanism. This result might help to understand behavior and preferences of these
two small and vulnerable groups.
With respect to e↵ective policy design, we point out the robust positive impact on contributions, through
introduction of a local inspector. This confirms that local community associations, controlled by members of
the community, may be an e↵ective instrument to improve and maintain social capital.
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Table&I&:&Intensity&of&armed&conflict&
Aguadas Neira Villamaría Manzanares Marquetalia 4Dept.4Caldas4
Homicides4rate42011 39.23 33.80 26.87 33.35 26.77
Homicides4rate42012 30.80 30.17 24.47 8.40 6.69
Average&Homicide&rate&last&12&years&(2001<2012) 49.30 59.91 35.58 58.91 39.74
Total4masacres4(1996H2012) 0 2 0 0 1 25
Forced4displacement4of4persons42012 17 5 10 14 18 340
Forced4displacement4(agregate419844H420124) 1915 910 458 1473 4303 77077
Forced4displacement4(agregate420014H420124) 1836 880 439 1424 4241 73550
Forced4displacement4(agregate420084H420124) 298 137 101 199 231 6016
Actions4from4armed4groups4(4agregate41998H20114) 5 0 0 9 1 175
Petitions4for4'Restitucion4de4Tierras' 12 1 3 4 4 288
Hectars4claimed4on4the4'Restitucion'4claims 351.52 0.59 10.30 5.01 34.01 12314.68
Incidence4by4armed4groups:4
Guerrilla4attacks 8 1 1 5 1
Paramilitary4groups4attacks 2 6 1 108 2
Guerrilla4members4killed 17 2 18 36 24
Paramilitary4group4members4killed 2 0 0 0 0
Civilians4killed 7 8 1 1 1
Souce:'Verdad'Abierta'Website'(retreived'8'june'2013).'Incidence'by'Armed'group'from'CERAC.
Table&II&:&Characteristics&by&municipalities&
Aguadas Neira Villamaría Manzanares Marquetalia 4Dept.4Caldas4
Population4(2009) 23383 29130 50123 24355 14880 976438
Index4Pressure4of4Displacement:4IPD4(inHflow) 2 0.5 1.3 9.5 22.7 4.2
Index4Intensity4of4Displacement:4IID4(outHflow) 5.7 2.3 0.6 4.6 13.1 6.2
Balance:&IPD<IID <3.8 <1.9 0.7 4.9 9.6 <2
Analfabetization4(population4154years4and4more) 12.4% 13.8% 7% 12.3% 12.5% 7.2%
Population4Level414SISBEN4(poverty4level)4(2009) 27.7% 20.2% 34.4% 40.8% 63.4% 33.4%
Population4with4Unsatisfied4Basic4Needs4(2009) 23.0% 22.6% 12.5% 28.1% 26.9% 17.8%
Share4of4tax4collection4in4Municipal4Gov.4revenues4(2009) 9.1% 15.6% 31.7% 7.7% 7.6%
Indicator4of4Municipal4Fiscal4Efficiency4(2009) 57.44 60.43 64.12 57.81 63.06
Public4services4coverage4(2005)
4H4Sewerage:4Main4urban4area4 98.3%4 98.9% 97.9%4 92%4 94.8%4
4H4Sewerage:4Rural4part4 434.4% 458.6% 73.5% 18.4% 4.1%
4H4No4energy,4sewerage4or4water4(4rural4) 3.6% 2.5% 2.2% 2.4% 3.8%
Source:'Carta'Estadistica'2010F2011'Departamento'de'Caldas.'Gobernacion'de'Caldas.
Indexes'of'Intensity'and'Pressure'of'Displacement:'Number'of'persons'affected'over'total'population.'
!!!
Table&III:&Summary&statistics&of&(A)&all&participants&(260&observations);&(B)&key&varables&by&region
A:
1.#Demographic#information# Mean% Std.#Dev. 3.#Coffee#Market:#Land#property#and#production# Mean% Std.#Dev.
Age% 51,5 13,44 Area%of%the%farm%(in%Hectareas) 4,05 4,32
Woman 40% 0,49 Production%in%2011%(in%arrobas) 160,88 249,74
Number%of%persons%that%share%same%home 3,83 1,96 Coffee%is%only%source%of%income%of%the%household 71,10% 0,45
Number%of%siblings 6,6 3,59 Share%of%income%from%coffee 73,28% 25,26
Number%of%children 3,21 2,39 Farms%other%crops%apart%from%coffee 17,69% 0,38
Born%in%the%municipality% 73,90% 0,44
%%%If%not%born,%years%in%the%municipio% 24,9 16,28 Renewal%of%the%coffee%plants%in%the%last%2%years 89,19% 0,31
Always%lived%in%this%municipio 75% 0,43 ###Renewal#with#financial#aid#from#FNC 61,92% 0,48
Someone%in%the%family%was%displaced%due%to%violence 9,61% 0,29 ###Renewal#with#financial#aid#from#the#cooperative 18,84% 0,39
Displaced%person%(forced%displacement) 3,46% 0,18
4.#Coffee#Market:#Cooperative
Education%level:% Attended%training%courses%out%of%the%cooperative 42,86% 0,49
###no#education 4,24% 0,2 Share%of%production%in%2011%sold%to%the%cooperative 91,65% 22,52
###from#1#to#5#years#of#primary#education 67,95% 0,46 Received%an%inspection%at%the%coffee%farm 66,93% 0,47
###from#6#years#primary#to#3#years#of#high#school# 1,54% 0,12 Years%in%the%cooperative 13,45 11,91
###from#6#to#9#years#of#high#school##(bachiller) 23,93% 0,42
###superior#education 1,54% 0,12 Reason%to%join%the%cooperative
%%%Coop%for%economic%help 50% 0,53
2.#Community#Involvement# %%%Coop%for%family%reasons 20,86% 0,41
%%%Coop%for%help%with%imputs 46,45% 0,49
Participation%in%community%association 40,32% 0,49 %%%Coop%for%social%beenfits%e.g.%education%programs) 50% 0,50
%%%Coop%for%better%price 65% 0,47
Identification%of%the%two%most%important%social%problems%in%the%community: %%%Coop%since%only%alternative%in%area%to%sell%coffee 13,38% 0,34
%%%Problems%of%violence 5,85% 0,23
%%%Low%returns%from%coffee 63,28% 0,48 Had%an%elected%post%at%the%cooperative%board 7,82% 0,26
%%%Bad%financial%management%at%the%municipality 25% 0,43 Never%goes%to%cooperative%meetings 11,15% 0,31
%%%Bad%financial%management%at%the%Community%level 10,15% 0,3 Always%votes%on%cooperative%elections 83,84% 0,36
Always%votes%on%FNC%elections 81,53% 0,38
B: All Aguadas Neira Villamaria Marquetalia Manzanares
Number6of6participants6 260 132 24 24 25 55
Not6born6in6the6municipality 26% 9,8% 46% 67% 48% 29%
Always6lived6in6the6municipality 75% 90% 54% 42% 60% 69%
Family6member6displaced6for6violence 10% 10% 4% 4% 20% 9%
Area6of6land6(in6hectar) 4,05 3,11 7,72 4,69 3,65 4,55
Production6in620116(in6arrobas) 160,88 143,75 144,85 206,32 76,90 243,30
Time6at6the6cooperative6(years) 13,45 15,22 9,22 7,18 11,61 14,41
Joined6Coop6for6social6help 50% 51% 42% 63% 52% 47%
Joined6Coop6for6price 65% 66% 63% 75% 56% 65%
Joined6Coop6since6only6alternative 13% 17% 9% 13% 4% 11%
Participates6in6Community6Association 40% 43% 42% 46% 44% 30%
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Table&IV&:&Contribution&to&abstract&public&good&when&no&control&is&available
Dependent'variable:'Points'out'of'10'contributed'to'the'group'envelope'(no'control)'
(1). (2). (3). (4).
Net'out@flow'area 2.512*** 2.344*** 1'371 1'401
(0.732) (0.799) (0.917) (0.953)
Net'in@flow'area 1.595** 1.212* 1'009 0.955
(0.740) (0.716) (0.776) (0.783)
Woman 0.116 @1.315** @1'038
(0.358) (0.554) (0.649)
Woman*net'out@flow'area 2.055*** 1.762**
(0.736) (0.802)
Woman*net'in@flow'area 1'090 0.830
(0.884) (0.949)
Constant 4.565*** @0.0587 4.966*** 0.351
(0.476) @1'913 (0.540) @1'976
Observations 255 253 255 253
R@squared 0.087 0.134 0.103 0.146
Individual'Controls N Y N Y
Sesion'fixed'effects' Y Y Y Y
Robust'standard'errors'(clusterd'ind)'in'parentheses:'***'p<0.01,'**'p<0.05,'*'p<0.1
Individual'controls:'education,'born'in'municipality,'Affected'by'displacement,'Other'income'apart'from'coffee,'age,'age'squared,'woman
Table&V&:&Contribution&to&abstract&public&good&game&when&control&is&available&
Dependent'variable:'Points'out'of'10'contributed'to'the'group'envelope'(with'and'without'control)'
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5). (6).
Treatment:'Local'control 0.790*** 0.789*** 0.789*** 0.814*** 1.064** 1.196***
(0.181) (0.183) (0.183) (0.185) (0.443) (0.437)
Net'outJflow'area 2.007*** 1.830*** 2.150*** 2.041***
(0.556) (0.604) (0.626) (0.671)
Net'inJflow'area 1.371** 1.273** 1.580** 1.544**
(0.621) (0.629) (0.676) (0.685)
Treatment'*'net'outJflow'area J0.287 J0.420
(0.515) (0.511)
Treatment'*'net'inJflow'area J0.418 J0.542
(0.540) (0.539)
Constant 5.765*** 6.721*** 4.714*** 1'710 4.577*** 1'519
(0.164) (0.412) (0.404) J1'658 (0.453) J1'661
Observations 511 511 511 507 511 507
Number'of'participants 256 256 256 254 256 254
RJsquared 0.022 0.073 0.073 0.102 0.074 0.103
Individual'Controls N N N Y N Y
Session'Fixed'effects' N Y Y Y Y Y
Standard'errors'(cluster'on'individual)'in'parentheses:***'p<0.01,'**'p<0.05,'*'p<0.1
Individual'controls:'education,'born'in'municipality,'Affected'by'displacement,'Other'income'apart'from'coffee,'age,'age'squared,'woman
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Table&VI&:&&Contribution&to&Public&Good&Game:&Preferences&for&local&control&
Dependent'variable:'Points'out'of'10'contributed'to'the'group'envelope'(with'and'without'control)'
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5).
Treatment:'Local'control 0.799*** 0.825*** 0.879*** 0.879*** 0.879***
(0.184) (0.186) (0.261) (0.263) (0.264)
Net'outJflow 2.147*** 1.775*** 1.972*** 1.812*** 2.135***
(0.539) (0.641) (0.568) (0.609) (0.713)
Net'inJflow 1.535** 1.358** 1.360** 1.268** 1'088
(0.599) (0.686) (0.624) (0.631) (0.727)
Preference:'LOCAL'control 0.237 0.0996 0.312 0.151 0.310
(0.276) (0.281) (0.327) (0.327) (0.588)
Treatment'*'Prefer'LOCAL'control J0.149 J0.102 J0.100
(0.368) (0.372) (0.373)
Net'inJflow'area'*'Prefer'LOCAL'control 0.430
(0.800)
Net'outJflow'area'*'Prefer'LOCAL'control J0.599
(0.694)
Constant 4.442*** 1'720 4.576*** 1'656 1'531
(0.389) J1'682 (0.438) J1'671 J1'665
Observations 507 503 507 503 503
Number'of'participants 254 252 254 252 252
RJsquared 0.076 0.103 0.076 0.103 0.110
Individual'Controls N Y N Y Y
Sesion'Fixed'effects' Y Y Y Y Y
Standard'errors'(clustered'on'individual)'in'parentheses:***'p<0.01,'**'p<0.05,'*'p<0.1
Individual'controls:'education,'born'in'municipality,'Affected'by'displacement,'Other'income'apart'from'coffee,'age,'age'squared,'woman
Appendix(A:(additional(tables(!!
!!
!!!!!!!
Table&A:1:&Descriptive&statistics&of&participants&with&personal&displacement&history
Displaced Left-behind Left%behind%in Left%behind%in All-sample Net%in,flow%area Net%out,flow%area
net%in,flow%area net%out,flow%area
Age 48,22 53,12 55,10 52,92 51,57 53,06 51,14
Women 11,1% 48,0% 40,0% 57,1% 39,6% 28,8% 46,8%
Not-born-in-town 88,9% 36,0% 50,0% 21,4% 26,2% 35,0% 15,4%
Family-in-coffee-business 66,7% 62,5% 55,6% 71,4% 64,1% 59,5% 67,9%
Does-not-have-other-incomes 11,1% 20,8% 22,2% 21,4% 29,0% 26,6% 31,4%
Did-renew-coffee-plantation 0,0% 4,2% 11,1% 0,0% 10,8% 8,9% 12,2%
Joined-coop.-for-family-history 11,1% 29,2% 10,0% 46,2% 20,9% 13,0% 26,0%
Joined-coop.-for-inputs 0,0% 50,0% 40,0% 61,5% 46,5% 31,2% 51,9%
Joined-coop.-for-social-help 22,2% 60,0% 60,0% 64,3% 50,0% 48,8% 48,7%
Joined-coop.-for-price 66,7% 52,0% 50,0% 57,1% 65,0% 62,5% 64,7%
Joined-coop.-as-unique-alternative 11,1% 12,5% 10,0% 15,4% 13,4% 9,1% 15,6%
Identifies-violence-as-a-problem- 11,1% 17,4% 22,2% 15,4% 5,9% 6,5% 4,5%
Number-observations 9 25 10 14 260 80 156
Question:%Which%are%the%two%most%important%social%problems%in%your%community?%Lack%of%oportunities%for%the%youth,%Bad%management%of%Community%
associations,%Bad%management%of%the%municipality,%Problems%to%get%employment,%low%returns%from%coffee,%Violence%in%the%area,%Lack%of%manpower.%
Table&A2&:&Contribution&to&abstract&public&good:&actual&in6&and&out6flows
Dependent'variable:'Points'out'of'10'contributed'to'the'group'envelope'(with'and'without'control)'
(1). (2). (3). (4).
Treatment:'Local'control 0.789*** 0.814*** 0.695* 0.770*
(0.183) (0.185) (0.392) (0.395)
Indicator'of'actual'outJflow'(IID2009) 0.418*** 0.381*** 0.275* 0.277*
(0.117) (0.127) (0.147) (0.152)
Indicator'of'actual'inJflow'(IPD2009) J0.180*** J0.163** 0.777* 0.547
(0.0619) (0.0692) (0.457) (0.506)
Treatment'*'IID2009 0.0252 0.0145
(0.0929) (0.0941)
Treatment'*'IPD2009 J0.00796 J0.00645
(0.0431) (0.0438)
Constant 4.698*** 1'693 3.584*** 0.854
(0.416) J1'662 (0.501) J1'684
Observations 511 507 511 507
Number'of'participants 256 254 256 254
RJsquared 0.073 0.102 0.073 0.102
Individual'Controls N Y N Y
Session'Fixed'effects' Y Y Y Y
Standard'errors'(clustered'on'individual)'in'parentheses:***'p<0.01,'**'p<0.05,'*'p<0.1
Individual'controls:'education,'born'in'municipality,'Affected'by'displacement,'Other'income'apart'from'coffee,'age,'age'squared,'woman
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Table&A3&:&Contribution&to&Public&Good&Game:&Location&and&personal&network&disruption&history
Dependent'variable:'Points'out'of'10'contributed'to'the'group'envelope'(with'and'without'control)'
(1). (2). (3). (4).
Treatment:'Local'control 0.789*** 0.814*** 0.789*** 0.814***
(0.183) (0.185) (0.183) (0.185)
Net'inIflow'area 1.310** 1.299** 1'054 1.087
(0.629) (0.635) (0.658) (0.669)
Net'outIflow'area 1.978*** 1.838*** 2.021*** 1.889***
(0.565) (0.609) (0.570) (0.611)
Left'Behind'from'displacement 0.390 0.293 I0.330 I0.234
(0.472) (0.500) (0.573) (0.636)
Net'inIflow'area'*'Family'Left'Behind 1.839** 1.444
(0.869) (0.900)
Displaced'individual I0.00863 0.0568 I0.105 I0.0359
(0.691) (0.687) (0.739) (0.719)
Constant 4.698*** 1'718 4.738*** 1.895
(0.417) I1'669 (0.419) (1.697)
Observations 511 507 511 507
Number'of'participants 256 254 256 254
RIsquared 0.075 0.101 0.084 0.106
Individual'Controls N Y N Y
Session'Fixed'effects' Y Y Y Y
Standard'errors'(clustered'on'individual)'in'parentheses:***'p<0.01,'**'p<0.05,'*'p<0.1
Individual'controls:'education,'born'in'municipality,'Affected'by'displacement,'Other'income'apart'from'coffee,'age,'age'squared,'woman
